

Hispano-Turkish Relations in Security and Defence: Realities of a Strategic Partnership

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Abstract

Bilateral relations between Türkiye and Spain in security and defense have gained prominence over recent decades due to evolving global and regional security dynamics. Positioned on opposite shores of the Mediterranean, both nations share strategic interests, particularly in addressing terrorism, regional instability, and migration crises. This article explores the historical trajectory and current state of Hispano-Turkish cooperation, focusing on two dimensions: bilateral agreements and collaboration within international organizations like NATO. The study situates this partnership within the broader context of Mediterranean regional stability, emphasizing its importance for NATO's Southern Flank. It argues that amidst global power shifts and the academic focus on great-power competition, middle powers like Türkiye and Spain play a critical role in shaping the international order. By examining historical developments and current dynamics, this work highlights the strategic relevance of Spanish-Turkish relations in security and defense, addressing how their growing articulation in these fields contributes to regional and global security. Ultimately, the study seeks to assess the potential of this partnership in an uncertain geopolitical landscape.

Keywords: Türkiye, Spain, Security, Defence.

Introduction

Bilateral relations in security and defense between Türkiye and Spain have gained increasing relevance within the context of global and regional security dynamics over the past decades. Both nations, historically established as powers on opposite shores of the Mediterranean Sea, share a series of strategic interests that have intensified as common challenges have emerged, such as terrorism, instability in the broader Mediterranean, and the impact of migration crises. It is, therefore, unsurprising that cooperation between these two countries in the fields of security and defense has significantly evolved over the last two decades through bilateral agreements and increasing convergence in multilateral forums. In these forums,

Spain and Türkiye have sought to strengthen their response capabilities to various threats and other issues of shared interest.

This article examines the historical trajectory and current state of security and defense cooperation between Türkiye and Spain across two main dimensions: the bilateral relations established between both nations and their convergence within international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), among others. This work, fundamentally exploratory, seeks to identify the main historical milestones in Hispano-Turkish relations concerning security and defense, determining their current state and potential. In a strategic environment marked by uncertainty stemming from notable transformations in the global power architecture currently underway, this partnership stands out as a key component for Mediterranean regional stability and security, particularly in what is recognized as NATO's Southern Flank (NATO, 2024).

In this sense, at a time when the academic discussion on the structure of the international system seems to give unquestionable prominence to the "great-power competition" (Lynch, 2020; DiCicco and Onea, 2023; Müller, 2024), overshadowing the influence of other state actors in the evolution of the liberal international order, this paper starts from the recognition of the role of the middle powers in this moment of transition (Laurance, 2023; Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2024), exploring the growing degree of articulation of Spanish-Turkish relations in the particular fields of security and defense. All this is done with the purpose of answering the following question: What has been the historical path of Spanish-Turkish relations, especially in the fields of security and defense?

Türkiye, Spain and Their Growing Multilateral Convergence

Like Spain, Türkiye occupies a privileged geostrategic position (Brzezinski, 1998) as one of the gateways to the Mediterranean. The shores of the Bosphorus divide its capital, Istanbul, and connect Europe with Asia through the Sea of Marmara. A Western ally and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Türkiye plays a prominent role in issues such as terrorism, the European Union's migration policies, and hosting NATO's Patriot missile defense systems on its territory (Patriot missile defense mission in Türkiye/Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)) (NATO, 2015). Moreover, Türkiye holds a highly advantageous position in the global oil market. Despite not being a major producer, it serves as a crossroads for key energy transit routes, making it an energy hub for transporting oil from the Caspian, the Middle East, and Russia to Europe (EIA, 2017). However, despite these factors, in the fragile international landscape, it seems that the West still questions which side of the "gate" Türkiye is on.

Türkiye, like Spain, has been committed to Mediterranean security and has played an active role in fostering dialogue and building bridges to connect the various shores of the Mediterranean. It was a founding member of the Barcelona Process (Union for the Mediterranean) and also participated in the controversial intergovernmental initiative "The Alliance of Civilizations" in 2005. This initiative aimed to bridge gaps through cultural dialogue between Western countries and moderate Islamic regimes. Despite facing political challenges, the initiative continues and is set to hold its 10th meeting on November 25, 2024, in Cascais, Portugal (United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, 2024).

A broad analysis indicates that, in a period of pragmatic reconfiguration of multilateralism, Türkiye, like Spain, supports a strong international institutional framework, with the United Nations at its core, to address the complex global challenges facing the international stage jointly. Both Türkiye and Spain are thus staunch advocates of an international system based on collective security and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Nevertheless, the evolving international system has significantly nuanced state positions toward more pragmatic and short-term perspectives. A more detailed analysis reveals that medium powers like Türkiye and Spain simultaneously defend national interests within multilateral frameworks through the development of so-called "nodal strategies." Türkiye's enduring connection to Asia further compounds this, with its position increasingly shaped by pragmatism. Since 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sought to position Türkiye as a regional power.

It is important to note that Türkiye has been a secular state since Mustafa Kemal established the Turkish Republic in 1923. With a population exceeding 85 million people (World Bank, 2023), 95% of whom are Muslim, the influence of civil society on power dynamics in Türkiye is inevitably shaped by these demographics. Reflecting this, Ankara suspended all trade exchanges with Israel in May 2024 until Israel agreed to a permanent ceasefire and allowed unrestricted humanitarian aid into Gaza. Significant internal protests have reinforced this stance, and as of mid-November 2024, Erdogan reaffirmed his position, stating, "The government of the Republic of Türkiye will not continue or develop relations with Israel" (Middle East Eye, 2024). Additionally, Erdogan has sought to achieve a common stance within the framework of the Arab League (Turkish Minute, 2024).

The EU: Dynamics of Cooperation Between Spain and Türkiye

This is just one example of how Türkiye's objectives in recent years have been modulated in relation to various international circumstances that shape its position and clearly influence its internal stances. Another example in this regard is the issue of Türkiye's accession to the European Union and the tensions it has generated. This topic, since 1999—when Türkiye became a candidate for EU membership after submitting its application in 1987—has divided the member states.

The path to accession has been long and arduous. The decision to start negotiations with Türkiye on October 3, 2005, is considered a historic moment in EU-Türkiye relations. However, no previous candidate has caused such a clear division among member states as Türkiye. Over time, it has become evident that the Turkish population has also shifted its perception, increasing their distrust toward an institution that demands substantial changes while frequently admitting other neighbors into the Union. Consequently, the Turkish government works to meet the Copenhagen criteria and educates its population on what it means to be European, yet public support for these measures remains a sensitive issue for Erdogan's administration.

The positions of EU institutions, member states, and Türkiye itself have evolved and sharpened over the years. This shift is primarily due to the roles played in significant issues such as the 2015–2016 migration crisis (along with various internal factors affecting each actor). Türkiye hosts one of the largest refugee populations globally, and its territory has facilitated the transit of hundreds of thousands of migrants from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan via the so-called "Western Balkans Route." Initially, this crisis concluded with a major agreement between Türkiye and the EU in 2016. Since then, both parties have worked jointly to

establish the EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye, which mobilized €6 billion for subsequent years in 2019 (Unión Europea, 2023).

Currently, the EU continues to rely on Türkiye for managing refugee crises. Beyond this mechanism, following the European Council's conclusions in June 2021, the EU allocated an additional €3 billion in humanitarian aid for the 2021–2023 period. Since 2011, the Union has invested nearly €10 billion to address migration issues involving Türkiye—an interesting euphemism for what could be described as outsourcing crisis management to a partner considered normative and value-based, but only within its own borders.

Regardless, it is evident that Türkiye is an important partner for the European Union in other areas as well, such as the customs union established between the EU and Türkiye in 1996. This customs union guarantees the free movement of goods through the application of EU regulations and the Common External Tariff while also aiding in the development of industrial standards. However, progress is still needed in other areas, such as agricultural products. Article 25.1 of the customs union agreement states: "Türkiye shall adjust its policy in such a way as to adopt the common agricultural policy measures required to establish freedom of movement of agricultural products. It shall communicate to the Community the decisions taken in that respect" (EC-Türkiye Association Council, 1995).

In December 2016, the European Commission proposed modernizing the customs union and expanding trade relations into new areas. In July 2024, the first meeting of a new EU-Türkiye High-Level Trade Dialogue took place in Brussels to advance this update (Comisión Europea, 2024). Moreover, the European Union is also of great importance to Türkiye, as it is Türkiye's largest trading partner for imports and exports. In 2023, 41% of Türkiye's exported goods were destined for the EU, while 29% of its imported goods came from the EU (Comisión Europea, 2023).

In conclusion, we can infer that these advances and "concessions" stem from the European Union's interest in deepening cooperation with its Turkish partner, with the idea that an improved functioning of the Customs Union would indirectly address other issues. This

includes matters related to prevention mechanisms, such as those designed to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions, particularly regarding energy issues and sanctions against Russia.

In this regard, the sanctions imposed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine have limited travel options for Russians, making Türkiye an attractive destination for Russian tourists, draft evaders, and oligarchs seeking to escape Western sanctions (Russian Travel Digest, 2023). This point, much like the migration issue, is crucial for the EU. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ensuing war, and the clear political and military support provided by the EU have sparked discussions about Ukraine's potential EU membership (European Union, 2022). In March 2022, the European Parliament supported Ukraine's candidacy, a decision seen as a clear affront to Türkiye and one that stoked significant nationalist resentment within the country.

Despite this, Türkiye plays a significant role in the Ukraine war, achieving notable successes in prisoner exchanges and deploying military drones, specifically the TB2 models manufactured by Turkish defense company Baykar. Above all, Türkiye has played a key role in establishing an agreement to ensure the safe transport of grain from Ukraine's Black Sea ports (Consejo de Europa, 2023).

While Turkish foreign policy has experienced a growing diversification as a result of an eminently pragmatic orientation, the center of gravity of Spanish foreign policy has increasingly revolved around the European Community institutions. This process of Europeanization, shaped according to Beneyto (2024) in a triple direction (vertical upward, referring to Spain's contribution to community construction; vertical downward, which concerns the transformation of national policies; and horizontal, relating to the construction of a European diplomatic identity), has allowed Spain to have access to a convenient platform for the projection of its own international agenda: "once the "isolation syndrome" derived from Francoism was overcome, Spain's participation in European politics since the early 1990s was determined by the will to turn Spain into a middle power anchored in Europe and an active protagonist in the evolution of the

EU's presence and action on the international scene" (Beneyto, 2024, 25). In this way, Spain would become an active promoter of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), especially in matters concerning the geographical areas of its special interest, namely: Ibero-America, the Maghreb and the Mediterranean.

NATO: Spain and Türkiye as Partners in Transatlantic Security

Türkiye also holds a prominent position in NATO. Its accession in 1952, alongside Greece, was agreed upon to counter communist expansionism and to control potential Soviet access to the Mediterranean. Türkiye thus became the southeastern pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and a key outlet to the Black Sea, while its integration into the political-military regional alliance sought to ease tensions between Greece and Türkiye. Since then, Türkiye has remained committed to NATO and collective Western security. Not in vain, after the United States, Türkiye has the largest armed forces among NATO member countries and represents one of the main contributors to the financing of the Alliance, in addition to having made notable contributions to different military operations, such as the NATO Kosovo Force (1999), the International Security Assistance Force (2003-2014) and the Resolute Support Mission (2014-2021) in Afghanistan; Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean (ongoing since 2016); NATO Training Mission Iraq (2004) and NATO Mission Iraq (ongoing since 2018) (Shkurti, 2022).

Despite its significant support in the fight against ISIS "Türkiye plays a crucial role in countering radical Shia and Sunni influences in the region, serving as an indispensable moderate power with substantial military capabilities" (Kenar, 2024; Felstead, 2023) the Kurdish issue has heavily impacted Türkiye's relations with NATO and the United States. In fact, it was one of the main reasons why the U.S. chose to invade Iraq in 2003 via Kuwait rather than through the north (DW, 2003).

More recently, Türkiye expressed strong reservations about Sweden's accession to NATO, primarily due to Sweden's support for the Kurdish cause. However, after more than 20 months of negotiations, the Turkish parliament ultimately approved Sweden's entry in January 2024 (Altun, 2023).

As Oğuzlu (2016) points out, in the post-Cold War context and coinciding with an increasingly active foreign policy as an emerging regional actor, Türkiye would adopt a new approach towards NATO, characterized by a more possessive attitude as well as critical of the transformation process of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, it is not surprising that, over the course of the last few years, Turkish foreign policy has with some recurrence received the qualification of "pragmatic" due to its pursuit of the Turkish national interest over other goals (Danforth, 2008; Kirişci, 2016; Basbugoglu & Korkut, 2023). This would become particularly clear with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2021, a framework in which Türkiye would adopt a position of some ambivalence between Russia and NATO. Historically, Russia has been a geopolitical rival of the former Ottoman Empire, and tensions between the two states have been constant. Among numerous conflicts, the most "dangerous" for regional stability occurred in November 2015, when Türkiye shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 aircraft near the Syrian border, leading to significant Russian economic sanctions on Türkiye (BBC Mundo, 2015). Since then, relations have gradually improved. Türkiye now serves as a transit country for Russian businesses in the Middle East and opposes Western sanctions on Russia—developments that have raised concerns within the Atlantic Alliance (Echeverría, 2019).

In this regard, the statements of the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, Numan Kurtulmuş, serve as an example. Addressing the Russian Federal Assembly in September 2024, he declared: "We do not accept the sanctions against Russia. (...) We do not consider them to be correct" (Swissinfo, 2024). However, Türkiye's role in various conflict zones such as the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean also raises concerns in Russia. These tensions stem notably from Ankara's stance as a key actor in the Syrian uprisings, advocating for the overthrow of the Al-As-

sad regime, and from its active involvement in the development of NATO's missile defense shield. The situation remains complex. As an industrial power, Türkiye has a clear dependence on energy resources, making a "distinct" relationship with the Kremlin strategically advantageous. At the same time, Türkiye is fostering ties with other emerging powers often labeled as revisionist by Western rhetoric. In this vein, Erdoğan first expressed a desire to join the BRICS forum in 2018, and in September 2024, Türkiye formally submitted its application for membership (France24, 2024).

Similarly, Erdoğan has shown interest in attaining full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which Türkiye has been a "dialogue partner" since 2012 (Reuters, 2022; Baños, 2022). This status, adopted in 2008, allows for institutionalized relations with third countries without granting them observer status.

For its part, even with a late entry into NATO, Spain has been an active member of the Atlantic Alliance for the past four decades. Although overshadowed by its continued non-compliance with the commitment made by heads of state and government in 2014 regarding the dedication of 2% of its national Gross Domestic Product to defense spending (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2024), since joining NATO in 1982 Spain has made notable contributions, both to the institutional architecture of the organization, as shown by the location of the NATO Air Operations Center at the Torrejón de Ardoz base, the High Readiness Land Headquarters in Bétera, the High Readiness Maritime Headquarters in Rota, or the Improvised Explosive Device Center of Excellence in Hoto del Manzanares; as well as the different deployments of forces that the Atlantic Alliance has carried out in Türkiye, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania (as part of Operation Persistent Effort), Latvia, Slovakia, Romania (deployment of ground forces on the Eastern Flank), Iraq (Iraq Support Mission as part of Operation Inherent Resolve), as well as in different maritime missions (Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean and NATO Permanent Naval Groupings) (Ministry of Defense, 2022).

Given the fundamental purpose of this article, it is more than pertinent to point out the importance of the aforementioned Operation “Support to Türkiye” in which, as part of the “Persistent Effort” mission, the Spanish Armed Forces have maintained a continuous presence through the deployment of a Patriot anti-missile battery at the Incirlik air base, located in the Turkish city of Adana and a few kilometers from the Syrian border. This deployment was initiated by Dutch troops in 2012 as part of the “Active Fence” mission, and three years later it would be Spanish military (members of different units of the Army and Air Force) who would assume the defense of Adana against the threat of a possible tactical ballistic missile attack from Syrian territory. This framework has even led to joint exercises between Spanish personnel deployed with the Turkish military, such as the one carried out in January 2024 between the AT XIX contingent and the 111th Squadron of the Turkish Air Force which, using F-4E fighter planes, would have the purpose of improving the training level of both parties (Estado Mayor de la Defensa, 2024).

From Regional Rivalry to Strategic Partnership

The relationship between Türkiye and Spain in the fields of security and defense, far from being limited to the circumstantial concurrence within international organizations of different kinds, is a reality that has materialized in a particularly clear way during the last decades as the result of long-standing historical processes. It is undeniable that their initial contacts in the 16th century saw the Habsburg dynasty and the Ottoman Empire engage in an intense rivalry as Mediterranean powers with universalist aspirations. This hostility, as noted by Gürkan (2023), was marked by covert espionage and counterespionage activities playing a fundamental role. However, as Martín (2001) observes, the latter half of the 18th century witnessed a significant break from the earlier dynamics, with increasingly notable commercial relations culminating in the Treaty of Peace and Commerce of 1782 (also

known as the Treaty of Constantinople). This agreement aimed to improve maritime security conditions in the Mediterranean (Government of Spain, 1782). This milestone marked a turning point from which, despite occasional setbacks, there was a gradual rapprochement, evidenced by various treaties. Among these, the 1959 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Türkiye stands out, declaring “inviolable peace and perpetual friendship” (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1961, 3542). This treaty provided a general framework for deepening Hispano-Turkish bilateral relations, which persists to this day.

With these historical antecedents, the terms of current cooperation between Türkiye and Spain began to take more concrete shape in the 1990s, peaking during the presidencies of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The rapport established between the two leaders led to the strengthening of bilateral relations and the implementation of several joint initiatives, tangible expressions of the productive Hispano-Turkish relationship that have continued in subsequent years.

Firstly, the creation of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), a project co-sponsored by both countries, sought to promote mutual understanding between Islamic societies and those of Christian tradition. This initiative placed significant emphasis on issues directly related to international security, including the establishment of a political and security committee within the High-Level Group promoting the Alliance of Civilizations (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, 2005). Secondly, the inaugural Türkiye-Spain Intergovernmental Summit in Istanbul in 2009 marked another milestone. This summit was conceived as a high-level dialogue mechanism between the two nations and, as of 2024, has convened a total of eight editions.

Although aspects related to defense cooperation between both nations have already been addressed since the first of these summits (and even have important precedents)¹, the most recent of these meetings, the VIII Intergovernmental Summit between Spain and Türkiye held in June 2024, is very representative of the level of maturity reached in the bilateral relations between Spain and Türkiye in this field. While a significant part of the cooperation between both nations in defense matters has been channeled through NATO with the notable Spanish participation in Operation Persistent Effort to support Türkiye being the clearest example.

This relationship has also been concretized through various commercial exchanges of defense material (Carrasco, 2024), such as the production in the 1990s of the multi-role CN235 aircraft under license with CASA (Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A., now Airbus); the construction in the Turkish Sedef shipyard of the amphibious assault ship TGC Anadolu (with a design inspired by the LHD Juan Carlos I, built by Navantia) (Defense Türkiye, 2018); or the acquisition of 10 A400M aircraft (assembled at the Airbus plant in San Pablo, Seville), the last of which was delivered in 2022. Likewise, in addition to these completed projects, there are other potential initiatives from the Turkish defense industry in which Spain seeks to play a key role, such as the construction by Navantia of a new amphibious assault ship capable of operating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Pérez, 2023), as well as a series of submarines based on the S-80 series; or the ongoing negotiation process for the purchase of 40 Eurofighter jets (Soriano, 2024).

In this regard, although the Turkish defense industry has achieved greater autonomy in recent years regarding imports (Egeli, Güvenç, Kurç, and Mevlütoğlu, 2024), Spain has become one of the main suppliers of defense material for Türkiye, alongside the United States, Italy, and Russia (Özlü, 2022). Thus, in the joint

declaration issued on the occasion of the VIII Intergovernmental Summit in 2024, it was stated that “The defense industries of both countries have a high potential for cooperation, as evidenced by the successful history of their bilateral collaboration, which both sides are eager to expand” (Joint Declaration: Eight Türkiye-Spain Intergovernmental Summit, 2024, p. 7).

On the other hand, cooperation in security matters and the fight against international terrorism has been one of the most prolific subjects on the bilateral agenda between Spain and Türkiye. After all, both countries share a series of similarities regarding the impact of terrorism: Spain and Türkiye are nations where the activity of the international terrorist organization DAESH has been significant over the last decade, leading both countries to maintain a strongly active policy of pursuing its members (Yalçınkaya, 2016; Reinales, García-Calvo, and Vicente, 2019). Likewise, both countries have a shared recent history concerning the impact of separatist terrorist organizations (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in Türkiye).

Considering all of the above, in addition to the necessary collaboration between both countries as members of various international organizations with different purposes and natures, it is not surprising that security cooperation has been an area in which several bilateral initiatives have been materialized, including the creation of a Joint Commission of Spanish and Turkish Security Forces as an institutional vehicle for this relationship, with particular emphasis on information sharing and operational coordination (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2009; 2014). In the same direction, and in order to deepen this relationship, the VIII Intergovernmental Summit of 2024 would highlight “the need for a comprehensive strategy in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, and organized crime, including the prevention of terrorist propaganda and the financing of terrorism” (Joint Declaration: Eight Türkiye-Spain Intergovernmental Summit, 2024, p. 8).

1 A good example would be the establishment of mechanisms aimed at facilitating technical defense cooperation between both countries, as evidenced by the adoption of the “Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Spain and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Türkiye on technical cooperation and in the defense industry” in 1999, after which the terms of classified information exchange in this area would be defined a few years later (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2024).

Conclusions

The analysis of Türkiye's position in the international sphere is a clear example of how the uncertainty and complexity of the system itself compel middle powers to adopt more pragmatic stances, establishing strategic nodes to improve their position in a competitive environment dominated by great powers. Türkiye has expanded its influence in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Eastern Mediterranean with the aim of shaping its immediate neighborhood according to its national interests. It is evident that Türkiye is a country committed to the Atlantic Alliance and collective Western security, but it also has an interest in "playing its cards" in the delicate international scenario. Spain is one of Türkiye's main supporters in its approach to the European Union, and successive Spanish governments have supported Türkiye within the EU. Ultimately, Türkiye is "the other side of the Mediterranean" and a partner to consider, as Spain is very interested in building a new centrality for the European Union in the Mediterranean and, by extension, for NATO to place more emphasis on the Southern flank.

At this time of fluidity in the international system, in which the structures of competition and cooperation left over from the so-called "post-Cold War" period seem to be undergoing a transition with a still uncertain outcome, the middle powers play a crucial role as mediators, stabilizers and key players in the management of global and regional challenges. Spain and Türkiye are paradigmatic examples of this category of states, given their strategic positioning and ability to influence multilateral affairs, and the increasing degree of articulation of their bilateral relations illustrates the potential for cooperation between middle powers to address shared challenges such as migration management, the fight against terrorism and other aspects concerning the stability of the Mediterranean area.

However, despite the upward trend of this bilateral relationship, its long-term development is not free of uncertainties: on the one hand, as an emerging power, Türkiye has been adopting a foreign policy of growing pragmatism and diversification, which has led it to adopt an ambivalent position towards global players among whom there are increasingly open antagonisms; meanwhile, Spanish foreign policy has undergone a gradual process of "Europeanization", making the Community institutions the platform through which it has tried to project its international agenda in Latin America and the Mediterranean. If sustained, the projection of these trends into the long-term future could entail a gradual decoupling of bilateral Spanish-Turkish relations in general and in the fields of security and defense in particular, especially those more directly dependent on the convergence of both nations in international organizations such as those addressed in this paper.

In conclusion, while the bilateral relations between Spain and Türkiye have undoubtedly reached a peak over the last two decades, collaboration on security and defense matters has not been an exception to this general dynamic. However, one might wonder if the good rapport between both nations could be altered in the future, considering the uncertainty arising from the ongoing reshaping of global power architecture, which presents a window of opportunity for the emergence of new dynamics of interrelations between societies and a realignment of alliances among states. Although the prospective identification of these potentialities will be the subject of future studies, all signs indicate that the relations of reciprocity, the existence of matters of common interest, and dynamics of complementarity are characteristic features of Spanish-Turkish relations, even in the realms of security and defense.

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Exploring the Roles of Türkiye and Spain in Shaping Global Governance in the United Nations Throughout the 2000s

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